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labour demand (price-setting) schedule: since it is based on the equality between
the marginal revenue product of labour and the real wage, its being positively
or negatively sloped depends, under imperfect competition, not only on labour
marginal productivity, but also on the behaviour of demand elasticity along the
…rms’ product demand function. This latter e¤ect may actually dominate the
technological one, inducing an e¤ect of ’slope reversal’ (Gali, 1994b, p.749). In
this framework, the same conditions on structural parameters, which guaran-
tee that a …scal expansion increases or decreases the elasticity of demand, may
generate a reversal of the slope of the labour demand schedule, in the direction
required for the policy to be expansionary
Our discussion is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop our basic
model. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy
through the transmission mechanism based on elasticity and the composition of
demand. We provide also a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the be-
haviour of the …scal multiplier derived in this set-up. In section 4 some possible
extensions of the analysis are considered, while brief remarks and conclusions
are gathered in section 5.
2 The basic set-up
We consider a simple monetary economy where households, …rms and the gov-
ernment interact in the goods, labour and money market. The labour market
is assumed to be competitive, while …rms are monopolistic competitors in the
goods market. Output is a composite good, made of n varieties. Each variety
is supplied by a single …rm, by means of labour only. We adopt a short run per-
spective, by taking the number of …rms (varieties) as given. Both households
and the government demand output, though the public and private demands
faced by any …rm are characterized by di¤erent demand elasticities.
2.1 The Households’ Behaviour
We assume that the economy is populated by a large number of identical house-
holds, so that their aggregate behaviour can be formalized in terms of a single
representative competitive household. Its objective function U is de…ned over
consumption of the composite good, C, real money balances, M=P , and labour
supply, L. We shall refer to a convenient, explicit, formulation of this util-
ity function, which satis…es the usual concavity and di¤erentiability properties:
in order to rule out any income e¤ect on labour supply, we assume that U is
additively separable with respect to labour, and homogeneous of degree one
in consumption and real money balances. Moreover, we assume that utility
is linear in labour and that aggregate consumption is a CES function of the
consumption of n varieties of output, Ci , i = 1; 2; :::; n:
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where µ is the constant marginal disutility of labour, and ½ is the household’s
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. The price P of the consump-
tion bundle (output) is given, consistently with the structure of the household’s
preferences, by the following function of the prices of the n varieties:
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The household maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraint:
nX
i=1
PiCi +M =WL+¦¡ Z +M;
where WL is nominal labour income, ¦ denotes nominal pro…ts, Z taxes in
nominal terms and M the initial endowment of money.
Given the de…nitions (2) and (3), the solution to the household’s maximiza-
tion problem generates the following demand for variety i:
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and optimal values for C, M , and L, which satisfy:
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where L is the total endowment of labour time. Notice that the labour supply
function takes a reversed L shape, being horizontal at the reservation wage º,
for L < L:
2.2 The Government
The n goods produced in the economy are demanded not only by the private
sector, but also by the government, which entirely …nances its expenditure with
lump-sum taxation. In modelling the government behaviour, we follow Heijdra
(1998) by assuming that the government sets public expenditure in real terms
in order to generate an amount G of a public good, which is obtained by using
all n varieties according to the following CES function:
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where ° is the elasticity of substitution.The main additional assumption we
introduce in this paper is that this elasticity of substitution is di¤erent from
that of the private sector. Once a level of public expenditure G has been chosen,
the government, which behaves competitively on the goods market, chooses
the quantity of each good Gi to be purchased, in order to minimize nominal
expenditure, i.e. the cost of production of the amount G of the public good.
Therefore we have the following dual problem:
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where PiG is the price paid by the government for good i (which in principle
might di¤er from that paid by the private sector). The solution for each Gi is
the following demand function
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where PG is the aggregate price index de…ned consistently with equation (8)3
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2.3 The …rms
On the production side, we assume that n monopolistically competitive …rms
produce, by means of labour only, the n goods that enter the private and public
consumption bundles. Though each …rm i produces a single good, Yi, which is
an imperfect substitute of all the others, we assume that the production function
is identical for all goods and given by:
Yi = L
®
i ; ® > 0 (10)
where Li is the amount of labour employed by …rm i. We do not impose a priori
any further restriction on the parameter ®, which determines the prevailing
returns to scale.4
On the basis of the optimal household’s and government’s decisions, we can
write the following demand function faced by …rm i:
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3 It can be checked that the solutions (9) and the price index PG are such that by substi-
tuting them into the government objective function
nP
i=1
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PiGGi = PGG.
4 In (10) increasing returns to scale are conceived of as increasing returns to labour. We
adopt this simplifying assumption in order to evaluate the impact of technological conditions
on the optimal behaviour of …rms in the labour market through one single parameter. It is
worth stressing right now that similar behavioural relations could be obtained by solving a
more articulated model in which returns to scale are evaluated with respect to both labour
and capital. See also Manning (1990, 1992).
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Notice that two relative prices appear in (11), Pi=P and PiG=PG. However,
we assume that …rms are not able to discriminate between the private and the
public sector, so that the price charged must be the same and Pi = PiG, for all i.
Since the market is characterized by monopolistic competition, each …rm chooses
this price in order to maximize nominal pro…ts, given the demand function (11),
the production function (10), and the aggregate price indices, P and PG. The
nominal wage is taken as given, under the assumption of perfect competition
on the labour market. The restriction that both ° and ½ - which turn out to
be also the elasticity of public and private demand for good i with respect to
its relative price - be greater than one, guarantees that the …rm’s optimization
problem is well-de…ned for any composition of demand.
Pro…t maximization entails the following …rst order condition:5
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where ²i = ½ + (° ¡ ½)Gi=Y di is the price elasticity of …rm i’s demand. The
latter is a weighted average of the elasticity of private and public demand,
where the weights are the share of each component in total demand.6 Notice
that the de…nition of ²i makes it clear that, though private and public demand
are isoelastic, the elasticity of the overall demand schedule faced by …rm i is not
constant.
2.4 The symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium
Since all …rms face identical demand functions and are subject to the same
technological constraint, their optimal price must be the same. This also implies
that under symmetry the two price indexes, P and PG, coincide:
PG = P: (13)
Therefore, all …rms face the same level of private consumption, the same level of
public consumption, and a fortiori the same level and composition of demand.
This implies that the elasticity of demand in the …rm’s symmetric equilibrium
can be written as:
²i = ² = ½+ (° ¡ ½)
eGfY d ; (14)
where we denote with e the per capita value of the relevant variable, and fY d =eC+ eG. Moreover, under symmetry each …rm employs 1=n of total employment;
therefore, by evaluating (12) in the symmetric equilibrium and by using (13)
and (14) we obtain:
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5Since we have imposed no restrictions on technology, we specify the following requirement
for the second order conditions to be satis…ed at the optimal solution: 1
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6Gali (1994a) studies a model where the two components of aggregate demand characterized
by di¤erent elasticity are private consumption and investment.
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This equation is generally called the price-setting (PS) schedule. It shows the
relation between the …rms’ desired level of employment and the real wage at
the …rms’ symmetric optimum. To close our macro model we notice that under
symmetry,
Y = neY = neL®: (10’)
By using (5), aggregate demand is
Y d = C +G = ¯
µ
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P
¶
+G; (16)
where T denotes real taxes. Equations (7-7bis), (10’), (15) and (16) determine
the equilibrium levels of L, Y , W=P , P , given the exogenous policy variables
M , G and T . Notice that, were the relative price elasticity of public and private
demand equal, ° = ½, then the system would exhibit the standard dichotomy
property associated with full wage and price ‡exibility: equations (7), (10’) and
(15) would determine L, Y , and W=P , independently of the demand variables
M , G and T .7 The essence of the elasticity transmission mechanism, however,
is that if ° 6= ½, then the real policy variable G actually enters the price-setting
rule; it may therefore a¤ect output and employment by changing the …rms’
desired mark-up.
3 The elasticity transmissionmechanism and the
properties of technology
It is clear from the above that the key equation of the model is the price-
setting schedule (15). Provided an equilibrium exists at L < L, an increase in
employment might occur, if an increase in public expenditure induces the …rms
to employ a greater amount of labour at the reservation wage º. Figure 1 shows
that this requires an upward shift of the PS schedule through a reduction in the
desired price-over-cost margin when the PS schedule is downward sloping, and
a downward shift of the curve via an increase in the desired mark-up when the
PS is upward sloping.
This suggests that preliminary to any study of the pro- or counter-cyclical
impact of public expenditure on the desired mark-up, is the analysis of the slope
of the PS schedule.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
3.1 The slope of the PS schedule
First, we notice that equation (14) con be written as:
²
³ eG; eL´ = ½+ (° ¡ ½) eGeL® ;
7We recall that the structure of the household’s preferences is such that any e¤ect on the
labour supply is ruled out.
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